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Abstract—The proliferation of low cost Internet of Things (IoT)
devices demands new encryption mechanisms over their wireless
communication channel. Traditional public key cryptography
(PKC) demands high computational power and is not suitable for
low power IoT devices, making them vulnerable to more powerful
eavesdroppers. Recent advances in physical layer security (PLS)
exploits common wireless channel statistics to generate symmet-
rical keys, but require accurate channel estimation and a high
communication signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). As most embedded
and underground IoT devices operate in low communication SNR
regimes, they cannot reliably use either PKC nor PLS encryption.
Many IoT devices monitor underground networked assets such
as water, oil, gas, and electrical networks. Here, we propose to
exploit the monitored physical dynamics data to act as a basis for
encrypting the digital information. Graph Layer Security (GLS)
is proposed for the first time here, as a way to encode networked
physical assets’ information via their graph signal processing
properties. Our approach is premised on the exploitation of
networked correlation in nonlinear physical dynamics for encryp-
tion and decryption. We achieve this using Koopman operator
linearisation and Graph Fourier Transform (GFT) sparsification.
The resulting GLS encryption scheme, like PLS, do not require
the exchange of keys or a public key, and is not reliant on wireless
channel properties. Using real world examples, we demonstrate
remarkably secure wireless communication encryption. We be-
lieve the technology has widespread applicability in secure health
monitoring for Digital Twins in challenging radio environments
and conclude our seminal paper with a discussion on future
development challenges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mass digitization of people and things has opened the
doorway to the Internet of Things (IoT), critical in many
social and industrial applications. In particular, IoT is en-
visaged to deliver the vital data to inform Digital Twins
and improve infrastructure maintenance and safety. In many
cases, wireless IoT sensors that measure physical signals (e.g.
gas pressure, water contamination) are buried underground.
Encrypting the critical infrastructure information is impor-
tant for national security, commercial sensitivity, and anti-
tampering requirements. Many current IoT wireless transmis-
sions (e.g. LoRaWAN, ZigBee) are vulnerable to eavesdrop-
ping. Authentication (e.g. over-the-air activation session keys
in LoRaWAN, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman in Bluetooth)
verifies the userâA˘Z´s identity and prevents malicious users
from accessing the network. Encrypted wireless transmission
protects data integrity and confidentiality [1].
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A. From Public Key Cryptography to Physical Layer Security
Conventional encrypted communications employ symmetric
encryption such as the advanced encryption standard (AES),
which relies on a secret key shared between them beforehand.
Public key cryptography (PKC) is the de facto key distribution
protocol. Although efficient conventional PKC schemes are
complex and computationally not suitable for IoT devices with
limited capability. This introduces not only a computational
cost challenge, but also sets the IoT devices at a disadvantage
against most powerful eavesdroppers with orders of magnitude
more computational power.
Physical layer security (PLS) has been proposed in recent
years as a way to overcome many of the aforementioned
challenges by using the wireless channel properties to create
symmetrical keys without the need for a PKC distribution
protocol [1]. PLS negates the risk of key intercept and high
computational requirement of PKC schemes, which makes it
very suitable for IoT devices. PLS does however require that
the wireless channel between nodes to be reciprocal (true
for most propagation environments), dynamic (fading), and
unique. This is to ensure robust symmetric key generation
and avoid brute force attempts. PLS has been applied to
a variety of embedded wireless and wired communication
systems [2]. The shortfall of PLS lies in it requires the IoT
devices to make accurate estimations of the wireless channel
statistics [3]. Accurate estimation requires reasonably powerful
signal processing units and also requires a reasonably high
communication signal to noise ratio (SNR). Many embedded
or underground IoT devices operate in low communication
SNR regimes, and therefore PLS is not suitable.
B. Introducing Graph Layer Security (GLS): Encryption using
Networked Physics
To overcome the PLS requirement for a high communication
SNR for accurate wireless channel estimation, we identify and
exploit a different physical attribute that is common to many
IoT sensors. The general idea to exploit common physics has
been proposed before, such as common heartbeat in different
medical IoT devices across a body. However, those devices
typically do not suffer from the aforementioned low communi-
cation SNR challenges. Here, we consider IoT devices placed
in underground or embedded networked systems, such as
oil/gas/water pipes, electrical networks, optical fibre networks,
and other underground connected systems. In networked phys-
ical systems, a common continuity equation connects all the
dynamics (e.g. Navier Stokes for flow, Nonlinear Schrodinger
for optic transmission, power flow for electricity). We propose
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Fig. 1. Illustration of digital Graph Layer Security (GLS) encryption scheme using a common physical dynamics. (a) physical dynamics at different points of
a utility network can exhibit correlated and unique dynamics which can be exploited by digital transceivers to encode their data without the need for public
key exchange. Sub-plots: (b) the GS algorithm steps and operators (from networked nonlinear dynamics to orthogonal basis vectors to symmetrical cipher
keys).
to exploit the common networked physical signals at different
IoT monitoring points to encrypt the IoT device’s wireless
data. This has the advantage of: 1) IoT sensors usually have
very high precision in measuring the physical signals, and
2) requires no specific knowledge or requirement of wireless
channel or public key distribution. This novel physical driven
security is distinctive from both PKC and PLS, and its security
independence from the digital environment makes it more
resilient against digital attacks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First we give
a brief overview of how we can exploit nonlinear networked
physical dynamics to encode digital IoT data. Then we go
to the results to showcase demonstrations premised on real
industrial networks. We then explain the methods in detail.
II. RESULTS
A. Brief Description of Approach
In this work, we propose a novel digital encryption
paradigm over a physical network - called graph layer security
(GLS). The process is data driven and model agnostic. As
shown in Fig. 1, we exploit the correlation (dependency) of
underlying networked physical dynamics to enable encryption
amongst digital transceivers without sharing a key or drawing
from a public key pool. As such, a key can be generated by
the physical dynamic on one node, and can be reconciliated by
other nodes or a centralized hub. To analyze the dependency
among nodes, we draw heavily on sparsifying high dimen-
sional networked nonlinear dynamics by the use of Koopman
linearization operator and Graph Fourier Transform (GFT) -
in order to identify and convert the dependency analysis into
a small subset of dominant and fixed basis. The way this is
achieved is shown in Methods and proven in SI with extended
validation results and theorem proofs.
Using the correlated physical dynamics and with the aid
of the GFT operator to reconciliate the dynamics (these form
the encryption basis in Fig. 1), we generate symmetrical keys
through the standard PLS steps of [3], [4]: feature extraction
and information reconciliation, quantization [5], privacy am-
plification and key agreement [6]. After which, two types of
secure GLS communications are designed: an ad-hoc multi-
hop node-node and a centralised node-hub communication
network.
B. Experimental Setting
The underlying network and the physical dynamics are
configured as follows. For the network topology, 1000 random
samples are configured via the ErdösâA˘S¸Rényi (ER) topo-
logical model, with N = 100 nodes and independent edge
included (i.e., Ai,j = 1) by probability of 0.5.
For the physical dynamics, four general nonlinear ODEs
commonly found to model real systems are used [7], [8]
separately below. We emphasize here such ODE models in Eq.
(1) are only used for dynamic generation, and are unknown
for the encryption and communication processes (e.g. process
is data driven and model agnostic).
Our algorithm is model agnostic and more sophisticated
models of higher dimensional ODEs or PDEs can be used,
but for the sake of a demonstration, we use the classic ODE
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Fig. 2. Performance of GLS. (a)-(c) are for multi-hop node-node communication. (a) gives ones illustration of (Tx,Rx) with relays whereby encryption and
decoding are leveraged on the linear dependency of physical dynamics. (b) shows the BER for node-node communications versus physical SNR of sensors
for dynamic collection. (c) provides the distributions of of (Tx,Rx) with different levels of BER. (d)-(f) are for node-hub uplink communication. (d) illustrates
node-hub uplinks whereby the encryption and decoding processes depend on the dynamic recovery at hub using sampling node set. (e) gives the BER for
node-hub communications versus physical SNR. (f) provides the distributions of uplinks with different levels of BER.
models provided in [9], i.e.,
dxi
dt
= F −Bxi −
N∑
j=1
Ai,jRxixj
dxi
dt
= −Bxi +
N∑
j=1
Ai,jRx
2
i
dxi
dt
= −Bxi +
N∑
j=1
Ai,jR
x2j
1 + x2j
dxi
dt
= −Bxi +
N∑
j=1
Ai,jR(1− xi)xj ,
(1)
where xi is the physical dynamic on node i, and the parameters
F , B, R are all set to 1 for demonstrative purposes. The value
of xi is detected at each node by an IoT sensor with a physical
SNR (not to be confused with communication SNR), which
is used to generate cipher keys.
In the physical network, any node could be a transmitter
(Tx), and the receiver (Rx) can be either a different node in
the physical network (node-node) or a digital hub (node-hub).
The channels for such communications are wireless and are
independent with the physical dynamics.
An eavesdropper is assumed to be able to intercept the same
encrypted wireless information with Rx. We assume that the
eavesdropper may have some knowledge of the underlying
model in Eq. (1) and the network topology, but do not have
access to the physical sensor data across the network. Our goal
is to minimize successful eavesdropping, and we minimize
the usefulness of the model knowledge through random signal
perturbations shown the Methods. We now show their results.
C. Performance of GLS
1) Node-node Communication: One illustration of multi-
hop node-node communication is provided by Fig. 2(a). The
information is encrypted at Tx node by its underlying physical
dynamic, and then transmitted and processed via a group of
selected relays and their dynamics (e.g., R1 and R2 in Fig.
2(a)). At the final Rx node, the encrypted information will be
received and decoded. The idea of encryption and decoding is
leveraged on the linear dependency of the underlying physical
dynamics in Tx, relays, and Rx nodes. Such dependency
analysis and relay selections are pursued in an off-line manner
by the Koopman linearization and GFT operator described in
Methods.
Fig. 2(b) shows two security benefits: 1) communication
security, and 2) encryption reliability, by providing the bit
error rate (BER) between (Tx,Rx) versus the physical SNR
of sensors for dynamic extraction. This further highlights the
security’s dependency on sensor accuracy rather than wireless
channel estimation quality or diversity (PLS) or public key
security. The BERs of (Tx,Rx) stay smaller than those of the
eavesdropper (constant ≈ 5 × 10−1). For sensitive physical
SNRs (as one expects of good IoT systems), the encrypted
communication channel can achieve a decryption BER of
≈ 10−4, 3-4 orders of magnitude better than the eavesdropper.
This indicates the encryption reliability of GLS, which can be
ensured solely by a cheap but accurate physical sensors (for
key generation and encryption), as opposed to the existing
wireless-based encryption (PLS) that requires complex and
unreliable channel estimation technologies.
We also demonstrate the two benefits via Fig. 2(c), which
provides the distribution of (Tx,Rx) pairs’ BER regimes, i.e.,
an order of 10−3 (including < 10−3), an order of 10−2, and an
4order of 10−1). It is seen that when physical SNR> 15dB, the
ratio of (Tx,Rx) with BER has an order of 10−3 approach to
1, suggesting 1) the communication security as BERs of most
eavesdroppers are 10−1, and 2) the encryption reliability that
depends on only the accuracy of sensors for physical dynamic
collections.
2) Node-Hub Communication: An up-link communication
from a Tx node of network to the hub is illustrated via
Fig. 2(d), whereby information is encrypted by the physical
dynamic of such node, and the decoding process at the hub
is leveraged on the recovered dynamic via the samples of
sampling node set. As is shown, the recovery error in terms
of the normalized root mean square (N-RMSE) is decreasing
with the increase of physical sensor SNR, demonstrating
the feasibility of using common features for encryption and
decoding.
In Fig. 2(e), the communication security and encryption
reliability are shown respectively by the decreasing BER with
rising physical SNR, and by the BER gap between node-hub
and eavesdropper. The security performance can be further
demonstrated by the distribution of node-hub uplink channels
into different BER regimes in Fig. 2(f). It is observed that
when physical SNR< 15dB, the ratio of uplink channels with
BER ≈ 10−3 approaches to 1, whereas the BER of most
eavesdroppers are constant to an order of 10−1.
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Graph Layer Security (GLS) is proposed for the first
time here, as a way to encode networked physical assets’
information via their graph signal processing properties. Our
approach is premised on the exploration of correlation and
dependency of nonlinear physical dynamics for encryption and
decryption. The advantage of this approach, as described and
demonstrated, is to rely solely on the IoT sensors’ accuracy
in measuring the physical dynamics x (e.g. water flow rate,
contamination, gas pressure, voltage) of a networked system.
Over the past few decades, we have developed cheap and
accurate sensors. Therefore, encrypting the digital information
by exploiting this accuracy makes sense compared to contin-
uously and accurately estimating the wireless environment in
PLS, which remains challenging for small IoT devices.
The challenge with GLS is to develop representative GSP
operators that can reflect the complex dynamics, especially
those that involve PDEs. Our prior work in sparse sensing
of water distribution networks has shown that GSP can be
applied successfully to Navier-Stokes PDEs in water distribu-
tion networks [10]. The generality of this data-driven approach
is strong as it does not require knowledge of the underlying
physical model, and indeed many real world systems do not
have one or involve couplings between ODEs and PDEs (e.g.
electricity grid connected to a thermo energy storage).
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we will elaborate the graph layer encryption
of node-node and node-hub communications, which exploits
correlated physical dynamics over the network. To do so, the
key steps are:
• artificially induce randomness into the underlying dynam-
ics in order to ensure that the model cannot be guessed
by brute force
• extract the sparse dependency of the dynamics in order
to generate cipher keys for encryption and decoding.
From these steps, the dependency analysis allows for the
selection of relays in the node-node case, and for the dynamic
recovery at the hub in the node-hub case.
A. Step 1: Dynamic Model with Random Perturbations
To generate the random dynamics, we induce a groups of
random-time harmless perturbations (e.g. a harmless noise)
into the physical network. As such, an discrete version of ODE
models in Eq. (1) is expressed as:
X:,k+1 = F(X:,k) + bk, (2)
where X = [xi(k·Ts)], k ∈ {1, · · · , L} is the discrete dynamic
matrix of size N ×L (representing N nodes and total L time-
indices sampled by Ts [11]), and X:,k (the kth column of X)
denotes the vector stacked by the dynamics of total N nodes
at kth time-index. F : RN → RN is the nonlinear evolution
function derived from the continuous differential equations.
bk is the artificially random-time injection, specified as:
bk = b ·
∑
ki∈N+
δ(k − ki). (3)
Here, we assign b = X:,1 as a known injection amplitude,
and δ(·) represents the Dirac function governed by the random
injection-time (i.e., ki ·Ts) aiming to generate the randomness
of physical dynamics, - see Fig. 3(a).
Given the modelling of Eqs. (2)-(3), the purpose of this
work is to encrypt the wireless communications of node-node
and node-hub, using the artificial physical dynamics of the
graph layer.
B. Step 2: Generate Symmetrical Keys: Linearization and
Sparsification
The GLS encryption requires the dependency analysis for
the relay selections (node-node) and the dynamic recovery
(node-hub). The difficulties lie in the non-linearity and ran-
domness driven by the evolution function F(·) and random-
time injection bk, as the direct dependency analysis from
the random and nonlinear dynamics on N nodes is hard to
pursue. Instead, we characterize and analyze the dynamics
by their dominant and fixed basis (orthogonal vectors). To be
specific, we at first generate a linearized evolution model by
Koopman operator. Then, a graph Fourier transform (GFT)
operator is designed to convert the dependency analysis of
random dynamics to the rows of dominant basis vectors.
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Fig. 3. Performance of Koopman linearization and GFT operator, which are designed to analyze dependency between random physical dynamics for node-node
and node-hub encryption. (a) shows the random physical dynamics generated by artificially random-time injection. (b)illustrates Koopman linearization that
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1) Koopman Linearization: Koopman linearization of a
nonlinear dynamic system is pursued by the Koopman opera-
tor, which is referred to as a linear operator that evolves the
selected observable functions defined on the original dynamic-
space. By defining the space of all observable functions as F ,
and stacking such observable functions as ψ = [ψ1, · · · , ψM ]T
with ψm ∈ F : RN → R and m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, the Koopman
operator K is specified as [12]–[14]:
K ◦ψ(X:,k) = ψ (F(X:,k)) = ψ(X:,k+1). (4)
Existing designs of observable functions are leveraged on
the Taylor series of the evolution function F(·), and requires
M = O(N2) observable functions for the multiplicative terms
[13], [14]. This makes them less attractive for large-scale
networks (e.g., N > 50), given the high computational and
storage consumption to process the Koopman operator of size
N2 × N2. To reduce the computational overhead for low
power IoT devices, we resort to a logarithm form observable
function which is able to convert the multiplicative terms by
the summation of M = O(N) logarithm terms. Here, we
provide the formulation of the logarithm observable functions,
i.e.,
Z:,k = ψ (X:,k) =
[
1,
xi,k
C
, log
(
1 +
(xi,k
C
)p)]T
,
∀i ∈ V, p ∈ {1, · · · , 5},
(5)
where Z is a matrix of size M × L of which the kth column
is denoted as Z:,k. C is a large constant to make sure xi,k/C
close to 0, and we assign C = 500 for this work. The detailed
deduction and explanation are provided in [15], and in SI.
One illustration of Koopman linearization based on logarithm
observable functions is provided by Fig. 3(b), in which we
convert the nonlinear dynamics as a linearized evolution,
by expanding the dynamic on each node via 6 observable
functions, therefore using only M = O(N) = 6× 100 = 600
observable functions. Then, an approximated Koopman op-
erator, denoted as K, can be specified for the evolution of
observable functions from time-index k to k + 1, i.e.,
Z:,k = K · Z:,k−1 + Z:,1 ·
∑
ki∈N+
δ(k − ki). (6)
The derivation of K is from the D groups of simulated
training dynamics denoted as X(d) and the corresponding Z(d)
from Eq. (5), d = 1, · · · , D, i.e.,
K =
[
Z
(1)
:,2:L, · · · ,Z(D):,2:L
]
·
[
Z
(1)
:,1:L−1, · · · ,Z(D):,1:L−1
]†
, (7)
where Z(d):,2:L represents the sub-matrix of Z
(d) by selecting all
rows and second to Lth columns, and (·)† denotes the Moore-
Penrose pseudoinverse of the matrix.
The accuracy of the Koopman linearization is provided in
Fig. 3(c), where x-axis represents the number of observable
functions, and y-axis is the Normalized-RMSE of the Koop-
man evolved dynamics to the original nonlinear dynamics.
It is observed that the Normalized-RMSE of the proposed
logarithm observable design can reach a small value (e.g.,
610−3) with only M = O(N) = 600 observable functions, as
opposed to the existing polynomial design in [13], [14] that
requires O(N2) = 10000. This demonstrates (i) the ability of
dynamic linearization by the proposed logarithm observable
functions, and (ii) the feasibility for further processing over
large-scale network (i.e., N > 50).
2) Graph Fourier Transform for Sparsification: Based on
the linearized dynamic evolution model, we develop a GFT
operator to pursue dependency analysis of random physical
dynamics on nodes. In essence, the GFT operator, denoted
as Γ−1, is a matrix that transforms the dynamic (observable)
space into a space spanned by graph basis (orthogonal vectors)
[16]–[21]. By denoting the graph basis as Γ = [γ1, · · · ,γM ],
we give the GFT and inverse GFT processes via following
equations and via Fig. 3(d):
Z˜:,k = Γ
−1 · Z:,k,
Z:,k = Γ · Z˜:,k,
(8)
where Z˜:,k represents the graph frequency response of Z:,k.
For this work, we aim to characterize the random dynamics
by r  N leading basis, and therefore convert the dependency
analysis to the rows of such leading basis. For this purpose,
we give our design of the GFT operator but leave the detailing
deduction in SI, i.e.,
(Γ,Σ,V) = svd
U · diag (U−1Z:,1) ·

λ01, λ
1
1, · · · , λL1
λ02, λ
1
2, · · · , λL2
...
λ0M , λ
1
M , · · · , λLM


(9)
where U · diag(λ1, · · · , λM ) · U−1 = K, and diag(·) is
to generate the diagonal matrix by vector. The number of
dominant basis, i.e., r, is selected to minimize the recovering
error of Z from Γ:,1:r · Z˜1:r,:, which has a trade-off between
the physical noise of sensors and the coefficient on rth graph
basis (as is shown by Fig. 3(e)). We give the computation of
r in the following, but leave the deduction in SI, i.e.,
r = argmin
r∈{1,··· ,M}
r · L · ς2 + I2 ·
M∑
i=r+1
σ2i , (10)
where I is the expected number of injection, ς2 denotes the
variance of physical sampling noise of sensor, and σi denotes
the ith singular value of Σ.
C. Step 3: Encrypted Communication
For any node n to act as the Tx, we encrypt the desirable
information s (a time-series of length L) via the physical
dynamic on node n, denoted as Xn,:, i.e.,
s∗ = s + Xn,:, (11)
where s∗ represents the encrypted information to be transmit-
ted.
1) Node-node Communication with Relay Selection: For
any Rx node m, the node-node communication is pursued by
the selected multi-hop relay nodes whose physical dynamics
are linearly dependent with each other, i.e.,
Xn,: +
ir∑
i=i1
α
(m,n)
i ·Xi,: + Xm,: = 0. (12)
In Eq. (12), i1, · · · ir are the selected relay nodes, and α(m,n)i
is the corresponding coefficient that will be determined in
advance. As such, s∗ can be transmitted via the relay nodes
i1, · · · , ir, each of which processes the received data via
αi · Xi,:, and transmits the processed data to the next relay.
Finally, Rx node m decodes the received data via Xm,: and
derive the decoded information sˆ, i.e.,
sˆ = s∗ +
ir∑
i=i1
α
(m,n)
i · xi + Xm,:
= s +
(
Xn,: +
ir∑
i=i1
α
(m,n)
i ·Xi,: + Xm,:
)
= s.
(13)
Then, we will elaborate how to determine the appropriate
relays nodes and their corresponding coefficients for each
(Tx,Rx) in advance. Recall that the relay selection for node-
node encryption is to find the nodes whose physical dy-
namics are linearly dependent with each other. Given the
merit of the GFT operator Γ−1, we convert such linear
dependency analysis on random dynamics to the selection
of dependent rows in Γ:,1:r = [γ1, · · · ,γr]. Here, we re-
sort to the orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP) [22], [23].
Define vector θ(i), i ∈ {1, · · · , N} as the positions of
[xi,k/C, log(1 + (xi,k/C)
p)], p ∈ {1, · · · , 5} in ψ(X:,k).
Then, for any node-node pair (Tx,Rx)=(m,n), the relay nodes
can be selected via the computation of weight vector α(m,n) =
[α
(m,n)
i1
, · · · , α(m,n)ir ] as follows:
min ‖α(m,n)‖l0
s.t. Γ
θ
(n)
1 ,1:r
+ Γ
θ
(m)
1 ,1:r
= α(m,n) · ΓM−{θ(n)}−{θ(m)},1:r
(14)
where Γθ(n)1 ,1:r
denotes the sub-matrix of Γ by selecting the
row with index as θ(n)1 (the first element in vector θ
(n)) and
columns with indices spanned from 1 to r.
2) Node-hub Communication: For node-hub encryption,
the idea is to select a subset of sampling nodes, whose physical
dynamics collected by the hub can guarantee the complete
dynamic recovery. As such, the information encrypted via the
physical dynamic on Tx node n can be decoded at the hub,
via the recovery of such dynamic, denoted as Xˆn,:, i.e.,
sˆ = s∗ − Xˆn,: = s +
(
Xn,: − Xˆn,:
)
= s. (15)
The processes of selecting sampling node and dynamic
recovery are leveraged on the graph sampling theory [16]–
[21], which is specified in the following.
7Selection of Sampling Node: We define S ⊂ {1, · · · ,M}
as the sampling node set. According to [16]–[21], the guaran-
tee of complete signal recovery from samples is:
rank (ΓS,1:r) = r. (16)
Eq. (16) is implemented via a greedy algorithm that maxi-
mizes the minimum singular of ΓS,1:r by finding and adding
row index to S, i.e., S ← S ∪ {i}, such that i =
argmaxj∈{1,··· ,M}−S σmin(ΓS+{j},1:r).
Physical Dynamic Recovery: After collecting the samples
from nodes in S, the hub then recovers the complete dynamics
for decoding the received information. We denote the samples
as ZS,:. The recovered dynamic observables, denoted as Zˆ is
computed as [16]–[21]:
Zˆ = Γ:,1:r · Γ†S,1:r · ZS,:, (17)
Then, for any k time-index, the recovered dynamics Xˆ:,k can
be derived via Xˆ:,k = ψ−1(Zˆ:,k).
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